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We  evaluate  a spillover  effect  of  the  Japanese  public  long-term  care  insurance  (LTCI)  as  a  policy  to stimu-
late family caregivers’  labor  force  participation.  Using  nationally  representative  data  from  1995 to  2013,
we  apply  difference-in-difference  propensity  score  matching  to investigate  the  spillover  effect  in  two
periods:  before  and  after  the  introduction  of the  LTCI  in  2000  and  before  and  after  its major  amend-
ment  in  2006.  Our  results  show  that  the  LTCI  introduction  has  signiﬁcant  and  positive  spillover  effects
on  family  caregivers’  labor  force  participation  and the  effects  vary  by gender  and  age.  In contrast,  the
LTCI amendment  is  found  to have  generally  negative  spillover  effects  on their  labor  force  participation.
We  draw  attention  to these  spillover  effects,  as  expanding  labor  market  supply  to sustain  the  economy
would  be a priority  for Japan  and other  rapidly  aging  countries  in  the  coming  decades.
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/).1. Introduction
Japan’s population has aged much faster than that of any other
country, creating an urgent issue for the government of the increas-
ing demand for long-term care (Campbell and Ikegami, 2000;
Tamiya et al., 2011). On another track, the Japanese government
is also concerned about sustaining the economy with an insufﬁ-
cient labor force in the context of a super-aged society (Schröder
et al., 2016).
In response to the former issue, the public long-term care insur-
ance (LTCI) system was launched in 2000 in Japan (Campbell and
Ikegami, 2000; Campbell et al., 2010). The LTCI is a mandatory
insurance with universal coverage. Its main objective is the “social-
ization” of the responsibility of long-term care (LTC) of old persons,
4 Address: University of Tsukuba, Department of Health Services Research, Fac-
ulty of Medicine, Department of Health Services Research, Laboratory of Advanced
Research D 740, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tenno-dai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8575
Japan.
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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onsidering the rising life expectancy, shrinking household size,
nd the increasing number of working women in Japan (Ministry
f Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), 2002). Every Japanese
ged 40 and older (40 + ) pays an LTCI premium; everyone aged
5 and older (65 + ) is eligible for beneﬁts on the basis of his/her
hysical and mental conditions, in six categories of need from the
ildest support required level (SL) to the most severe care level
 (CL5).5 Premiums are approximately one percent of income for
hose aged 40–64 years; for those 65+, premiums are on average
PY5,500 per month (about USD54, purchasing power parities in
016) (MHLW, 2015). Regarding the beneﬁts, eligible recipients 65+
eceive formal care services from suppliers in the LTC market and
re ﬁnancially supported by the government payments for the fees.
arious services − both at-home and institutional − are covered:
ousekeeping, bathing, visiting nurse, rehabilitation, day services,
hort-stay service/care, medical care management counseling, wel-
are devices leasing/purchasing, and home renovation are included
n at-home services; nursing homes as well as chronic-care hospi-
als are included in institutional services. Recipients pay barely 10
ercent of the fees (Tamiya et al., 2011).
As formal and informal care are partial substitutes (Charles and
evak, 2005; Stabile et al., 2006), the generous formal services cov-
red in LTCI are expected to mitigate unpaid family caregivers’
urden. Being released from some aspects of caregiving, eco-
omically active caregivers may  opt to increase their labor force
articipation (LFP) or re-enter the labor force. This improved LFP of
aregivers − a positive spillover effect of LTCI − shall be assessed
o offer a more comprehensive insight into the importance of LTCI
rrangements.
Various studies in Western countries explore the differences
n LFP between caregivers and non-caregivers, with the ﬁndings
eing inconclusive (Lilly et al., 2007). Van Houtven et al. (2013) ﬁnd
ale caregivers in US are less likely to work than non-caregivers.
n addition, Skira (2015) ﬁnds female caregivers in the US are more
ften likely to provide intensive care for their parents, and report
 less likelihood of working than non-caregivers. Lilly et al. (2010)
nd that caregivers in Canada have lower LFP than non-caregivers.
armichael and Charles (2003) ﬁnd that providing care more than
0 h per week results in lower LFP in the UK, regardless of gender.
n contrast, Dentinger and Clarkberg (2002) ﬁnd that US male care-
ivers postpone their retirement more than non-caregiving men;
cGarry (2006) argues that US female caregivers cut back on leisure
ime in order to provide care. Studies using Japanese data consis-
ently show a negative impact of care duties on LFP (Iwamoto, 2001;
ugawara and Nakamura, 2014; Yamada and Shimizutani, 2015).
In most of the literature, LFP is measured among caregivers aged
5–64 years in the light of corresponding mandatory retirement
egislations. Excluding people older than 65 from analyses, under
he current demographic changes, overlooks an increasing extent
o which older persons enter the labor force. The latest labor force
tatistics in Japan and the US reveal LFP ratios at 42.7 percent and
0.8 percent for people aged 65–69 years (Bureau of labor statistics,
016). More importantly, as over half of the caregivers in Japan are
5 Speciﬁcally, “SL” referred to recipients living independently but requiring help
or  Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL). “CL1” recipients need more assis-
ance in terms of IADL compared to “SL” recipients. “CL2” recipients have additional
eed with basic Activities of Daily Living (ADL) above “CL1” and “CL3” recipients
equire more services than those in “CL2,” thus needing total care. “CL4” recipients
ulﬁll all the above-mentioned conditions and have poor functioning in terms of ADL.
CL5” recipients ﬁnd it impossible to live without care and have stronger needs in
erms of ADL than “CL4” recipients. In 2006, the amendment re-categorized “SL” and
CL1” into “SL1” and “SL2,” where “SL1” applies to recipients living independently
ut requiring help with IADL, and “SL2” denotes those requiring more assistance
han “SL1” recipients and might deteriorate to “CL1.” Care recipients in “SL1” and
SL2” are eligible for preventive long-term care (PLTC) services, and those in “CL1-5”
re  continuously eligible for LTC service.nomics 56 (2017) 103–112
65+ (Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare, 2013), analysis of LFP
among caregivers aged 65+ will help inform family and labor policy
formulations in the context of a super-aged society. Accordingly, we
extend the scope of this study to include caregivers 65+.
There is potential endogeneity between LFP and caregiving
activity where researchers argue that the lower LFP of caregivers
stems from their caregiving activities (Lilly et al., 2007). People that
have a weaker/stronger attachment to the labor force are more/less
likely to self-select into caregiving (Henz, 2004; Van Houtven et al.,
2013). As many studies focus exclusively on caregivers and uti-
lize cross-sectional data, it is difﬁcult to adjust for endogeneity
(Bolin et al., 2008; Heitmueller, 2007). Recent studies tackle the
issue using instrumental variable (IV) and panel data (Bolin et al.,
2008; Coe and Van Houtven, 2009; Heitmueller, 2007; Leigh, 2010;
Van Houtven et al., 2013). However, disagreement exists among
these study methods toward the effect of preexisting labor status
on the likelihood of care provision, leaving the potential endogene-
ity unresolved. To address endogeneity in this study, we apply
a difference-in-difference propensity score matching (DID-PSM)
approach (Schmitz and Westphal, 2015) to control for observable
demographic and socio-economic differences between caregivers
and non-caregivers.
While studies in Western countries include both male and
female caregivers (Lilly et al., 2007), many of those in Japan focus
exclusively on female caregivers (Sugawara and Nakamura, 2014;
Oshio and Usui, 2017; Shimizutani et al., 2008). In Japan, men’s care-
giving is increasing. According to the Ministry of Health Labor and
Welfare (2013), the rate of male caregivers has increased threefold,
from 11.2 percent in 1984–31.3 percent in 2013, which might be
associated with the rising unemployment rate among male workers
(Takahashi, 2015). In their recent research, Fukahori et al. (2015)
ﬁnd that male caregivers have a lower LFP by 7–10 percent than
non-caregivers. We  include both male and female caregivers in
our analysis and we explore the gender differences in LFP among
Japanese caregivers.
As regards the spillover effect of LTCI, Coe et al. (2015) ﬁnd that
adult children in the US providing care to their parents report a
higher likelihood of working with LTCI. Studies in Japan, mean-
while, have not reached a consensus about such spillover effect.
Tamiya et al. (2011) ﬁnd a higher LPF of caregivers with high house-
hold income with LTCI; Sugawara and Nakamura (2014) also ﬁnd
improved LFP for female caregivers. Instead, Fukahori et al. (2015)
and Sakai and Sato (2007) do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence for the
spillover effect of LTCI on caregivers’ LFP.
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the preceding
literature analyses a potential negative spillover effect on LFP of
the LTCI amendment in 2006. As the LTCI operated as a pay-as-
you-go program, an increase in demand for LTC services promoted
a great ﬁscal challenge for the government. During its ﬁrst ﬁve
years, the expenditure on LTCI soared from 3.6 to 6.4 trillion yen,
much faster than expected (Shimizutani and Noguchi, 2004). A cru-
cial reason was the sharply increasing number of recipients with
mild care needs (Campbell et al., 2010; Sugawara and Nakamura,
2014; Tamiya et al., 2011). Accordingly, the government amended
the LTCI in April 2006 to contain the costs by reducing beneﬁts for
recipients with mild care needs − those in SL and CL1. In addition to
the existing LTC services, preventive long-term care (PLTC) services
with fewer beneﬁts were constructed for these recipients (Tsutsui
and Muramatsu, 2007).
The process of amendment is illustrated in Fig. 1. In March
2006, i.e. the month just before the amendment, about 700,000 and
1,400,000 recipients were in SL and CL1, accounting for half of the
total recipients. One month later, 91.3 percent of SL recipients were
moved to a temporary category, the so-called temporary support
required level (TSL). Then, TSL recipients would be re-categorized
into either of the newly-established support required level 1 (SL1)
R. Fu et al. / Journal of Health Economics 56 (2017) 103–112 105
Fig. 1. Trends in Proportions of Care Level during LTCI Amendment.
Note: SL is the abbreviation for support required level, TSL for temporary support require
Data
Source: Monthly report of Fact-ﬁnding Survey on Project of Long-term Care http://www.
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To identify treated respondents whose LFP improved after the
LTCI introduction in 2000, we combine the data from the question-
naires on household and health from 1995 to 2004 (i.e., the latest
6ig. 2. Re-categorization of recipients in SL and CL1 in the Amendment.
ote: SL is the abbreviation for support required level, CL1 for care level 1.
r support required level 2 (SL2). As Fig. 2 illustrates, SL recipients
ere re-categorized to SL2 only if they suffer from serious health
eterioration, otherwise they went to SL1 (Suzuki, 2007). No mat-
er into which category TSL recipients were re-categorized, they
ecame eligible for PLTC services rather than LTC services. Sim-
larly, CL1 recipients stayed only if their health was expected to
eteriorate shortly; otherwise they were re-categorized into SL2
Fig. 2). In addition, they were no longer eligible to utilize LTC ser-
ices if moved to SL2. In May  2006, more than 60,000 and 50,000
ecipients in TSL and CL1 had been re-categorized into SL1 and SL2,
espectively. One year after the amendment, the number of recipi-
nts in TSL was negligible and one-third of the CL1 recipients were
oved to SL2.
As previously mentioned, the amendment reduces beneﬁts for
ecipients using PLTC services. First, the types of services cov-
red in PLTC are fewer compared to those in LTC. For instance,
ousekeeping that had been provided to SL recipients before the
mendment was no longer available for SL1 recipients. Further-
ore, the monthly upper limits of ﬁnancial support for SL1/2
ecipients were reduced (Table 1).
For recipients re-categorized from SL to SL1, the monthly upper
imit was reduced from JPY61,500 (17.2 percent to that for CL5)
o JPY50,030 (13.7 percent to that for CL5). Similarly, for those re-
ategorized from CL1 to SL2, the upper limit decreased from 46.3
ercent to 29.0 percent to that for CL5. Meanwhile, the upper limits
or CL2-5 recipients remained in terms of the percentage to the
pper limit for CL5.
Studies show that the amendment contains the LTCI cost to a
ertain extent (Tamiya et al., 2011). On the other side of the coin, the
aregiving burden came back to households. As of 2006, caregivers
f the PLTC recipients, once again, carried on the care duties that
ad been shared with formal care suppliers. The reloaded burdend, SL1-2 for support required level 1–2, and CL1-5 for care level 1–5.
mhlw.go.jp/topics/0103/tp0329-1.html#itiran.
may  reduce caregivers’ labor force commitment and this impact
should be examined to assess the overall spillover effects.
To this end, this research analyses the spillover effect of the LTCI
on caregivers’ LFP corresponding to the two  policy changes of the
LTCI: the introduction in 2000 and the amendment in 2006. The
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data. Sec-
tion 3 describes the econometric strategies. Section 4 presents the
empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and measurements
We use the data of the Comprehensive Survey of Living Con-
ditions (CSLC), which is a nationally representative repeated
cross-sectional survey of the non-institutionalized population in
Japan. The CSLC has been conducted once every three years
from 1986 by the MHLW.6 The CSLC contains four question-
naires focusing on household, health, income/saving, and LTC.7The
questionnaires related to household and health cover full respon-
dents, comprising 600,000–800,000 people from approximately
300,000 households in each survey year. The questionnaires on
income/saving and LTC complementarily cover a part of the full
respondents, including around 100,000 and 6000 people, respec-
tively.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the outcome variable to represent LFP in this
study. We  conﬁrm respondents’ current work statuses by a ques-
tion to respondents in the household questionnaire: “Are you
currently working?” and consider respondents to be “currently
working” if they self-report having full- or part-time jobs, other-
wise categorize them into “currently not working.” Furthermore, to
analyze the inﬂuences of the LTCI introduction and amendment on
LFP, we  separate the respondents respectively into two  groups: one
includes respondents whose LFP are affected by the policy changes
(i.e. treatment group), and the other includes those unaffected by
the policy changes (i.e. control group).
2.1. Treatment and control groups for the LTCI introductionThe CSLC is conducted every year, whereas a large-scale survey including plen-
tiful  information necessary to our analysis is conducted every three years.
7 LTC questionnaire was newly introduced into the CSLC after the introduction of
LTCI  in the year of 2000.
106 R. Fu et al. / Journal of Health Economics 56 (2017) 103–112
Table  1
Upper limits of allowance for (P)LTC services before and after 2006 amendment.
Before After
Care Level Service Upper Limitsa Care Level Service Upper Limitsa
JPY %b JPY %b
SL LTC 61,500 17.2 SL1 PLTC 50,030 13.9
SL2 PLTC 104,730 29.0
CL1  LTC 165,800 46.3 CL1 LTC 166,920 46.3
CL2 LTC 194,800 54.4 CL2 LTC 196,160 54.4
CL3  267,500 74.7 CL3 269,310 74.7
CL4  306,000 85.4 CL4 308,060 85.4
CL5  358,300 100.0 CL5 360,650 100.0
a The upper limits for (P)LTC care utilization in JPY. Practically, the upper limits are set in terms of point, and one point corresponds to JPY10 on average. We simply show
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okyo, and to JPY10.2 in Hokkaido.
b The percentages are derived in terms of the upper limits for CL5, respectively.
urvey year before the amendment). The treatment group includes
espondents aged 30 years and older (30 + ) who are main care-
ivers for co-residential care-needing old persons aged 65+; and
he control group includes respondents 30+ who are not caregivers
ut co-resident with old persons 65+.8 The procedure through
hich we ﬁnd a main caregiver is as below. We  conﬁrm his/her
ousehold-member identiﬁcation number by a question to every
are-needing old person in the household questionnaire: “Please
eport the household-member identiﬁcation number of your main
aregiver living with you.” We  then match the number to that of all
ousehold members related to this old person to identify his/her
ain caregiver.
.2. Treatment and control groups for LTCI amendment
To identify treated respondents whose LFP are negatively
ffected by the 2006 amendment, we merge three questionnaires:
ousehold, health, and LTC questionnaires, from 2001 to the lat-
st 2013. In the LTC questionnaire, each recipient is required to
eport his/her current care (support) level. Based on the informa-
ion, we identify recipients suffering from the reduced beneﬁts after
he amendment. Caregivers for these recipients have to resume
are duties and thus reduce labor force commitment. The treat-
ent group includes caregivers 30+ of recipients 65+ who  are in
L before the amendment and in SL1 afterwards (SL-SL1), because
hey are eligible for LTC services before the amendment and for
LTC service afterwards. The control group includes caregivers 30+
f recipients 65+ in CL2-5 before and after the amendment. As the
ontrolled caregivers are eligible for LTC services, they are regarded
o be unaffected by the policy change.
Two points are worth mentioning. First, we exclude caregivers
f recipients re-categorized into SL2 after the amendment from the
reatment group. Although most of the SL2 recipients were in CL1
efore the amendment (CL1-SL2), some of them were in SL (SL-
L2) (Suzuki, 2007; Tsutsui and Muramatsu, 2007). The amendment
educes beneﬁts for the CL1-SL2 recipients, but increased the ones
or the SL-SL2 (Table 1). Put differently, caregivers of the two types
f recipients were motivated oppositely in terms of LFP. Due to
ata limitations, we could not verify precisely the proportion of
L1-SL2 caregivers; including caregivers of SL2 recipients as such
ould disturb the validity of our ﬁndings.
Second, we include caregivers of CL4-5 recipients into the con-
rol group in order to guarantee sufﬁcient sample size for analyses,
ince CL4-5 recipients account for over 26 percent of the 6000
8 We focus on respondents aged 30+ in order to balance the characteristics of
on-caregivers and caregivers. Merely 0.61 percent of caregivers are under 30 years,
hile 21.7 percent of the non-caregivers are under 30.s slightly among prefectures. For instance, one point corresponds to the JPY11.4 in
recipients in each survey year. Meanwhile, we are concerned about
the systematical differences between CL4-5 caregivers and SL-SL1
caregivers. To address the issue, we match each of the SL-SL1 care-
givers with similar CL2-5 caregivers using various factors about
their demographic, socio-economic, and health statuses. We  con-
ﬁrm that CL2-5 (including CL4-5) caregivers do not systematically
differ from SL-SL1 caregivers. Details of the matching process are
discussed in Section 3. We  also conﬁrm the robustness of our results
by including only CL2-3 caregivers into the control group (Appendix
I).
3. Empirical strategies
We  apply the difference in difference (DID) approach
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1985; Heckman et al., 1997) to
examine the effects of the LTCI introduction and amendment on
caregivers’ LFP. The essence of the method is to compare the
change in LFP YPt of treated respondents before and after the policy
changes P of the LTCI system E(Y1t+s − Y0t |P = 1) to a counterfactual
change E(Y0t+s − Y0t |P = 1), as if they were not affected by the policy
changes. The counterfactual change, in turn, is an actual change for
controlled respondents, i.e., E(Y0t+s − Y0t |P = 0) if a common trend
assumption E(Y0t+s − Y0t |P = 1) = E(Y0t+s − Y0t |P = 0) is satisﬁed.
The common trend assumption indicates a crucial criterion for
the DID method, that is, treatment and control groups should be
randomly assigned. In practice, researchers often utilize a similar
criterion to determine the two groups by nature or by uncontrol-
lable factors (Heckman et al., 1998). When we  assess the inﬂuence
of the LTCI introduction on LFP, ideally, the control group should be
caregivers randomly or naturally extracted to be unaffected by the
LTCI. Similarly, when we assess the inﬂuence of the LTCI amend-
ment on LFP, the ideal control group shall be the SL-SL1 caregivers
randomly selected to receive beneﬁts at the pre-amendment level.
In the case of such randomizations, simply comparing the LFP
between treatment and control groups yields an average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT); and changes in ATT after LTCI policy
changes correspond to the changes in spillover effects. Unfortu-
nately, it is impossible to do so since the Japanese LTCI is a universal
coverage system. It is also unethical to select old persons randomly
to receive beneﬁts at different levels.
To make the common trend assumption more credible, alter-
natively, we  extract the controlled respondents to match the
treated ones based on their similarity in terms of propensity scores.
The propensity score p(P = 1|X) measures the probability of being
treated conditional on a set of covariates X, where only controlled
respondents with propensity scores overlapped within a band-
width to those treated are extracted for DID estimations. In this
study, this propensity score matching (PSM) process is conducted
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eparately for gender- or age-speciﬁc subsamples. Speciﬁcally, the
ample is divided into male and female cohorts and into cohorts
ged 30–49 years, aged 50–64 years, and aged 65+. Criteria for these
roups consider the gaps of willingness and capability to provide
are to old persons living with and to enter the labor force across
he subsamples. Compared to women and older people, men  and
oung people commonly have a stronger willingness to work and
n turn are less willing to take on care duties. Furthermore, the PSM
s conducted respectively for the introduction of LTCI in 2000 and
ts amendment in 2006. In each matching process, we  ﬁrst derive
he propensity score using a logistic regression,
ogit(ps,P) = ˛0 + Xs,P˛s,P + . (1)
The subscript s = sg, sa deﬁnes subsamples, where sg and sa
epresent the gender-speciﬁc and the age-speciﬁc subsamples,
espectively; P = I, A stands for policy changes, where I for the LTCI
ntroduction and A for the amendment. The X is a set of covariates
epresenting respondents’ individual and household characteris-
ics, as well as the health statuses of old persons being cared for or
o-resident with the respondents. Speciﬁcally, Xsg,I includes the
ndividual characteristics which are age in years, marital status
four categories, married as reference), regular outpatient (yes=1),
elf-rated health (ﬁve categories, very good as reference), subjec-
ive symptoms (12 categories, none as reference); the household
haracteristics which are household ownership (yes=1), within a
hree-generation household (yes=1), number of household mem-
ers, and monthly household expenditures (log scale); and the
ealth statuses of old persons which are their self-rated health
ﬁve categories, very good as base). The Xsa,I includes almost the
ame covariates as those in Xsg,I , except that the age in years is
eplaced by gender (male=1). In a similar fashion, Xsg,A and Xsa,A
omprise a set of individual and household characteristics, whereas
he covariates here indicating health statuses of recipients are their
edridden levels (four categories, completely bedridden as base).9
We  include these covariates because literature suggests that fac-
ors shall be taken into consideration for PSM as long as they are
elated to the probability of being treated or the outcome (Austin,
011; Brookhart et al., 2006; Garrido et al., 2014; Ho et al., 2007).
ccording to preceding studies, people who are women, older, with
hildren at home, with a small household and lacking caregiver
ubstitutes are more often to be caregivers and less likely to enter
he labor force. In the Japanese context, middle-aged people hav-
ng ownership of residences are often found to co-reside and look
fter their parents (Takahashi, 2015), indicating that the health of
o-resident old persons would affect people’s LFP. Moreover, peo-
le with unfavorable health statuses (e.g., regular outpatient) may
e selected into caregiving (Schmitz and Westphal, 2015) and stay
ut of the labor force.
With the propensity scores, we then match and compare the
utcome of each treated respondent to a weighted set of outcomes
f controlled respondents using the Gaussian kernel matching
ethod. Speciﬁcally, the outcomes of control respondents are
eighted inversely by their distance in propensity score from that
9 For analysis of the 2006 amendment, we exclude the subjective symptoms of
aregivers in PSM due to the insufﬁcient number of observations. As we utilize
he  LTC questionnaire for the second analysis, the observations shrink consider-
bly since only about 6000 (or approximately 1 percent) out of all respondents
o-residing with recipients are extracted randomly to answer the LTC questionnaire
n  each survey year. Accordingly, many of the subjective symptoms are lack of suf-
cient observations to provide statistically signiﬁcant results. For instance, merely
9  treated male and 33 female caregivers report subjective symptoms concerning
kin and gynecology, respectively. On the other side, the observations for self-rated
ealth are comparatively adequate for analyses and previous studies conﬁrm that
elf-rated health could be one of the most appropriate indicators to measure an
ndividual health status (DeSalvo et al., 2006).nomics 56 (2017) 103–112 107
of each treated respondent, within a bandwidth (i.e. 0.06) of the
score (Heckman et al., 1997); outcomes of those propensity scores
located outside the bandwidth are disregarded (the so-called com-
mon  support constraint). The kernel PSM is a quasi-experimental
design to derive ATT as if the treatment were randomly assigned.
We thus can trace the changes in ATT after each policy change to
obtain the DID-PSM estimators as follows,
DIDP =
1
NTP
∑
i ∈ TP∩SP
⎡
⎣(Y1i,t+s − Y0i,t) −
∑
j ∈ CP∩SP
wij
◦
(Y0j,t+s − Y0j,t)
⎤
⎦ . (2)
Here the subscript P = I, A stands for the two  policy changes;
i and j denote respondents in treatment group TP and control
group CP, respectively; SP represents the area of common sup-
port, and wij shows the corresponding weight for kernel matching.
The estimators DIDI and DIDA in Eq. (2) catch the improvement
and degeneration of caregivers’ LFP with the introduction and
amendment of LTCI, after removing systematic differences between
treated and controlled respondents.
4. Results
4.1. Kernel matching and covariates balancing test
We show the sample size, the mean and median standardized
differences (SD) across all covariates (%) before and after kernel PSM
(Table 2). Comparing the size of matched subsamples on common
support to that of unmatched ones, we  conﬁrm that over 99 percent
of the treated respondents, for both the two policy changes, have at
least one controlled respondent staying within the 0.06 bandwidth
of their propensity scores. Meanwhile, around 95 percent of the
controlled respondents are matched to someone treated.
The mean and median SD across all covariates provide a frame-
work to test the extent to which the post-PSM subsamples are
quasi-experimentally randomized. The randomization is achieved
when treated respondents are matched with highly similar con-
trols such that the mean and median SD across all covariates shall
be trivial between treatment and control groups. Although there is
no generally agreed upon criterion as to what extent the SD implies
signiﬁcant imbalances of covariates, maximum SD at 10 percent is
taken to signify negligible differences (Austin 2009, 2011; Ho et al.,
2007). For LTCI introduction, the mean and median of covariates
in the post-PSM subsamples are commonly balanced, as all the SD
are less than ten percent; strong balances in covariates after PSM
are conﬁrmed for the LTCI amendment as well, where all the SD
are less than ﬁve percent. The overall balances in all covariates,
nonetheless, do not guarantee balance in each covariate involved.
We further test the balance in mean SD of each covariate in the
post-PSM subsamples (Tables 3 and 4).
4.1.1. Covariates balancing for the LTCI introduction
Notable differences of confounding covariates between care-
givers and non-caregivers are commonly found across pre-PSM
subsamples (Table 3). Generally, caregivers are overrepresented
among those older, female, widowed, having regular outpatient
care visits, with poor self-rated health, and having various sub-
jective symptoms needing care. Moreover, old persons co-residing
with caregivers are more likely to report poor or very poor self-
rated health, compared to those living with non-caregivers. All the
covariates are balanced in post-PSM subsamples, i.e. mean SD <10
percent.Gender- and age-speciﬁc differences are found for several
important covariates. Compared to non-caregivers, male caregivers
are more often to be single and report very poor self-rated health,
less often owning a house, having smaller family size and lower
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Table  2
Sample Size, Mean, and Median Standardized Differences across All Covariates before and after Matching
Gender Age
Male Female 30-49 50-64 65+
U  M(on) M(off) U M(on) M(off) U M(on) M(off) U M(on) M(off) U M(on) M(off)
Kernel PSM for 2000 LTCI Introduction
Treated 7483 7447 36 25,592 25,400 192 5735 5700 35 13,888 13,766 122 4431 4378 53
Control 219,046 210,380 8666 318,453 311,803 6650 235,362 225,030 10,332 170,210 161,746 8464 69,999 65,632 4367
Mean% SD 34.7 8.3 13.6 4.9 16.8 5.1 14.4 4.3 14.1 8.7
Median% SD 27.1 6.5 11.5 3.2 11.4 4.8 10.5 2.9 10.9 5.1
Kernel  PSM for 2006 LTCI Amendment
Treated 561 561 0 1322 1320 2 317 314 3 893 893 0 675 674 1
Control 2432 2418 14 7448 7395 53 1214 1108 106 4503 4334 169 4436 4369 67
Mean% SD 18.9 4.7 20.7 2.0 23.1 3.4 19.4 2.5 22.9 2.9
Median% SD 6.2 2.8 10.2 1.3 4.1 2.1 6.4 2.5 10.5 2.8
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wU” = Unmatched Sample Size; “M(on)” = Matched Sample Size on Common Suppor
Mean  SD” = Mean Standardized Difference (%) in Covariates; “Median SD” = Median
onthly household expenditures; such imbalances are not con-
rmed for females. In Japan, once men  are married, they tend to
ransfer care duties to their wives; single men  usually have no
hoice but to take on the duties. Regardless of age, the female/male
atio of caregivers is overwhelmingly higher than that of non-
aregivers. Age-speciﬁc differences reveal that caregivers aged
0–49 are overrepresented among those that are single, while those
lder than 50 years report the opposite.
.1.2. Covariates balancing for the LTCI amendment
Still, treated respondents differ systematically from controls
efore the PSM. Speciﬁcally, the SL-SL1 caregivers are overrepre-
ented among those who are male, younger, and have their own
ouses, compared to the CL2-5 caregivers (Table 4). Moreover, old
ersons cared by SL-SL1 caregivers report a notably higher likeli-
ood of being independent and a lower likelihood of being severely
edridden, which indicates that the SL-SL1 caregivers have a lower
are burden than CL2-5 ones.
Gender differences are conﬁrmed as well. Male SL-SL1 care-
ivers are more often to be single compared to the CL2-5 ones;
hereas their female counterparts are fairly balanced in terms of
arital status. We  verify that single males in Japan take the care
uties because of having a lack of substitutes and here we  further
now that they are more often caring for old persons with mild care
eeds. All these imbalances diminish after the PSM, i.e. mean SD of
ach confounding covariate is less than 10 percent.
.2. Positive spillover effect of the LTCI introduction
After PSM, we assess the effect of LTCI introduction on improving
aregivers’ LFP (Table 5). Compared to the matched non-caregivers,
emale caregivers are 10.3 percent less likely to work before the LTCI
ntroduction in 2000; worse still, male caregivers are 25.4 percent
ess likely to work. The disadvantage in female caregivers’ LFP is
n line with preceding literature in Japan, and the lower LFP for
ale caregivers builds on the related research with two points:
irst, men  in Japan do reduce their labor force commitment for
aregiving activities. This potential labor force loss is not negligi-
le regarding the fact that over one third of the Japanese caregivers
re male (Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare, 2013). More impor-
antly, men  are more likely than women to quit the labor force once
hey take on the care duties. In our case, the reduced likelihood of
orking for male caregivers is double that for females.
The disadvantages in caregivers’ LFP are largely mitigated withhe introduction of LTCI. DID-PSM estimators ﬁnd that LTCI does
mprove the LPF of caregivers, in particular, for males. Commonly,
en  have a stronger labor force attachment than women; mean-
hile, men  take care duties mainly because of having a lack ofoff)” = Sample Size off Common Support.
ardized Difference (%) in Covariates.
caregiver substitutes. This indicates that the LFP of male caregivers
would be more sensitive to the formal services than females. Specif-
ically, with the LTCI introduction, male caregivers become 15.8
percent more likely to enter the labor force, ﬁve times as much
as the 3.7 percent for females.
The enhanced LFP for female caregivers is important as well. The
last decades have seen an increasing number of Japanese women
being highly educated and employed as full-time workers. For
them, balance between work and caregiving is more stressful than
that for traditional housewives (Hashizume, 2010). According to
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2013), 80.5
percent of caregivers who quit their jobs are female and merely
17.7 percent of them would re-enter the labor force. The success
of LTCI on encouraging female caregivers to remain/re-enter in the
labor force is a good lesson for other polices aiming to stimulate
women’s LFP.
Regardless of age, caregivers show lower likelihoods of work-
ing before the LTCI introduction; such disadvantage is three times
greater for caregivers aged 30–49 than for those aged 65+. In fact,
82.8 percent of the non-caregivers aged 30–49 are working, indicat-
ing strong labor force attachments among this cohort. The high LFP
of young people, however, is fragile with respect to the decision to
provide caregiving. As previously mentioned, young caregivers are
usually less wealthy and with small household sizes. Their unfavor-
able socio-economic statuses − being unable to pay for the formal
services without LTCI and short of caregiver substitutes − give them
no choice but to take on the care duties. Thereby, these young
caregivers would be more sensitive than older ones to the formal
services and ﬁnancial support from the LTCI.
Indeed, the LTCI stimulates the LFP of caregivers in all age
cohorts. As expected, young caregivers aged 30–49 report the
largest improvement − 8.7 percent − in likelihood of working.
Caregivers aged 50–64 and 65+ also have a better chance to work
after the LTCI introduction, though the improvement in likeli-
hood diminishes with age. It is well-known that Japanese people
approaching retirement or being retired, compared to other devel-
oped countries, have a stronger willingness to remain in or re-enter
the labor force (Williamson and Higo, 2007). The leading reasons
for late middle-aged and older Japanese to work are to maintain
favorable living standards and to achieve self-satisfaction (Cabinet
Ofﬁce, 2006). Regarding their physical conditions, older Japanese
usually prefer to start part-time jobs in their post-retirement lives.
Older caregivers, however, may  ﬁnd it difﬁcult to enter the labor
force, as they often face immediate family members with inten-
sive care needs (i.e. spouses). The formal care services release older
caregivers from daily caregiving and the ﬂexible work schedules
of part-time jobs make their LFP practical. With the rapid pop-
ulation aging, public policies have been dedicated to motivating
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Table  3
Covariates Balancing for 2000 Introduction: Mean and Mean Standardized Differences before and after Matching.
Individual Characteristics Gender Age
Male Female 30–49 50–64 65+
T C Mean SD T C Mean SD T C Mean SD T C Mean SD T C Mean SD
Age U 65.31 49.70 126.1a 59.36 56.18 25.1a
M 65.31 64.33 7.5 59.36 57.82 7.7
Male  0.14 0.37 -73.6a 0.12 0.40 -66.0a 0.17 0.22 -33.6a
0.14 0.17 -9.3 0.12 0.13 -7.8 0.17 0.18 -5.7
Marital Statuses: married as base
single U 0.14 0.10 12.4a 0.05 0.06 -3.7 0.14 0.20 -15.3a 0.07 0.04 14.0a 0.03 0.01 15.7a
M 0.14 0.13 3.9 0.05 0.06 -2.9 0.14 0.16 -6.3 0.07 0.05 8.9 0.03 0.02 9.8
widowed U 0.03 0.01 15.4a 0.04 0.01 13.4a 0.01 0.01 -3.3 0.06 0.03 18.0a 0.06 0.01 23.3a
M 0.03 0.02 6.7 0.04 0.03 5.5 0.01 0.01 -3.1 0.06 0.05 4.4 0.06 0.04 7.8
divorced U 0.04 0.03 5.6 0.03 0.02 5.8 0.05 0.03 9.0 0.04 0.02 11.3a 0.01 0.00 9.6
M  0.04 0.03 5.7 0.03 0.02 4.7 0.05 0.03 8.5 0.04 0.03 9.0 0.01 0.01 6.4
Regular outpatient U 0.52 0.29 48.5a 0.51 0.42 17.6a 0.28 0.20 17.9a 0.45 0.41 10.5a 0.66 0.58 16.9a
M 0.52 0.51 8.7 0.51 0.49 4.1 0.28 0.26 6.8 0.45 0.42 6.8 0.66 0.63 7.6
Self-rated Health: very good as base
good U 0.17 0.18 -3.2 0.17 0.17 -0.5 0.18 0.18 0.5 0.17 0.17 0.9 0.15 0.16 -2.3
M  0.17 0.17 -0.1 0.17 0.17 -0.4 0.18 0.18 0.5 0.17 0.17 0.7 0.15 0.16 -1.6
fair  U 0.43 0.43 -1.0 0.47 0.47 -0.4 0.46 0.43 5.7 0.47 0.47 -0.9 0.48 0.49 -1.9
M  0.43 0.42 1.9 0.47 0.47 -0.2 0.46 0.43 5.4 0.47 0.47 -0.6 0.48 0.49 -1.0
poor  U 0.18 0.09 29.5a 0.17 0.12 13.8a 0.10 0.07 11.3a 0.15 0.11 12.5a 0.19 0.15 12.4a
M 0.18 0.16 6.6 0.17 0.15 5.0 0.10 0.08 9.6 0.15 0.12 9.9 0.19 0.16 8.5
very  poor U 0.02 0.01 11.8a 0.02 0.01 5.7 0.01 0.01 4.7 0.02 0.01 5.9 0.02 0.02 2.5
M  0.02 0.02 5.9 0.02 0.01 4.3 0.01 0.01 4.4 0.02 0.01 4.5 0.02 0.02 1.9
Subjective Symptoms: none as base
whole body U 0.14 0.08 19.2a 0.21 0.14 19.0a 0.16 0.08 22.0a 0.20 0.12 23.1a 0.20 0.15 14.7a
M 0.14 0.12 6.5 0.21 0.19 5.2 0.16 0.15 5.7 0.20 0.17 8.4 0.20 0.18 6.7
eye  or ear U 0.20 0.07 38.0a 0.19 0.13 18.3a 0.07 0.05 11.1a 0.18 0.12 18.0a 0.25 0.17 20.7a
M 0.20 0.19 6.6 0.19 0.18 4.6 0.07 0.05 9.4 0.18 0.16 7.3 0.25 0.23 8.7
chest  U 0.08 0.03 20.4a 0.07 0.05 11.5a 0.04 0.02 10.5a 0.07 0.04 10.1a 0.10 0.07 10.2a
M 0.08 0.06 7.1 0.07 0.05 9.2 0.04 0.02 9.8 0.07 0.05 8.0 0.10 0.08 7.3
respirator U 0.14 0.07 23.9a 0.09 0.07 7.6 0.08 0.06 10.0a 0.09 0.07 6.7 0.11 0.08 9.0
M  0.14 0.13 3.1 0.09 0.07 6.0 0.08 0.06 9.4 0.09 0.07 5.1 0.11 0.09 6.8
digestive U 0.12 0.08 15.2* 0.14 0.10 12.3a 0.10 0.07 11.9a 0.14 0.10 12.5a 0.15 0.12 9.7
M  0.12 0.10 6.5 0.14 0.11 9.9 0.10 0.08 9.2 0.14 0.10 9.9 0.15 0.13 7.2
teeth  U 0.09 0.05 16.8* 0.09 0.06 11.8a 0.06 0.04 11.4a 0.09 0.06 10.9a 0.10 0.06 11.5a
M 0.09 0.07 8.1 0.09 0.06 9.5 0.06 0.05 8.7 0.09 0.07 8.7 0.10 0.07 8.6
skin  U 0.09 0.04 18.8a 0.06 0.04 6.4 0.05 0.03 5.6 0.06 0.05 4.9 0.06 0.05 3.0
M  0.09 0.07 6.4 0.06 0.05 5.1 0.05 0.03 5.3 0.06 0.05 4.0 0.06 0.05 2.0
muscle U 0.29 0.16 32.3a 0.38 0.28 22.5a 0.24 0.14 23.8a 0.36 0.25 23.1a 0.42 0.34 16.7*
M  0.29 0.26 6.3 0.38 0.36 8.0 0.24 0.22 9.4 0.36 0.33 8.4 0.42 0.41 2.0
urology U 0.10 0.02 33.9a 0.04 0.03 7.2 0.01 0.01 5.4 0.04 0.03 5.7 0.06 0.04 8.8
M  0.10 0.08 8.4 0.04 0.03 5.7 0.01 0.01 5.0 0.04 0.03 4.4 0.06 0.05 6.4
gynecology U 0.01 0.01 3.4 0.04 0.01 17.7a 0.00 0.00 4.6 0.00 0.00 4.8
M  0.01 0.01 2.7 0.04 0.03 6.6 0.00 0.00 3.6 0.00 0.00 3.1
trauma  U 0.02 0.01 5.8 0.02 0.01 3.2 0.02 0.01 4.6 0.02 0.01 2.8 0.02 0.02 0.1
M  0.02 0.01 4.3 0.02 0.01 2.5 0.02 0.01 4.3 0.02 0.01 2.2 0.02 0.02 0.1
Household Characteristics
House ownership U 0.89 0.96 -24.4a 0.94 0.95 -6.5 0.93 0.96 -15.6a 0.94 0.95 -4.3 0.93 0.97 -16.3a
M 0.89 0.91 -7.3 0.94 0.95 -5.1 0.93 0.94 -8.8 0.94 0.95 -3.3 0.93 0.94 -4.8
Three  generation U 0.31 0.62 -65.6a 0.51 0.52 -2.5 0.75 0.73 3.6 0.48 0.48 0.6 0.33 0.32 3.2
household M 0.31 0.32 -4.3 0.51 0.52 -2.0 0.75 0.73 3.4 0.48 0.48 0.5 0.33 0.32 2.5
Number of household U 3.31 4.62 -79.5a 4.12 4.26 -7.7 4.72 5.06 -22.0a 3.95 3.92 1.6 3.66 3.60 2.9
members M 3.31 3.20 3.7 4.12 4.23 -6.1 4.72 4.84 -7.7 3.95 3.93 1.2 3.66 3.62 2.1
Monthly household U 3.10 3.31 -35.0a 3.28 3.28 -1.0 3.35 3.36 -1.8 3.31 3.30 2.1 3.19 3.20 -1.5
expenditure (log) M 3.10 3.22 -3.7 3.28 3.28 -0.8 3.35 3.36 -1.7 3.31 3.30 1.8 3.19 3.20 -0.8
Old  Persons Characteristics
Self-rated Health: very good as base
good U 0.06 0.15 -31.3a 0.10 0.16 -17.9a 0.10 0.16 -18.3a 0.08 0.15 -21.7* 0.09 0.16 -20.6a
M 0.06 0.08 -2.7 0.10 0.12 -4.5 0.10 0.12 -7.3 0.08 0.10 -7.5 0.09 0.10 -4.1
fair  U 0.32 0.38 -17.5a 0.31 0.47 -33.3a 0.34 0.48 -29.6a 0.34 0.48 -28.1a 0.27 0.47 -41.1a
M 0.32 0.34 -5.1 0.31 0.34 -7.0 0.34 0.37 -8.1 0.34 0.45 -8.7 0.27 0.40 -8.1
poor  U 0.36 0.19 39.7a 0.39 0.18 47.7a 0.38 0.18 47.3a 0.38 0.19 43.5a 0.39 0.17 52.1a
M 0.36 0.34 7.8 0.39 0.37 9.4 0.38 0.35 8.8 0.38 0.22 6.4 0.39 0.21 9.0
very  poor U 0.21 0.12 30.8a 0.15 0.02 47.5a 0.14 0.02 45.9a 0.13 0.02 41.0a 0.20 0.02 60.0a
M 0.21 0.19 9.2 0.15 0.13 6.3 0.14 0.13 6.6 0.13 0.05 8.1 0.20 0.10 7.4
“T” = Caregivers; “C” = Non-caregivers; “Mean SD” = Mean standardized difference (%)
a Inference: absolute value of mean standardized difference above 10%.
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Table  4
Covariates Balancing for 2006 Amendment: Mean Differences before and after Matching.
Individual Characteristics Gender Age
Male Female 30-49 50-64 65+
T C Mean SD T C Mean SD T C Mean SD T C Mean SD T C Mean SD
Age: aged 65+ as base
30-49 U 0.14 0.11 10.8a 0.22 0.15 18.4a
M 0.14 0.13 2.2 0.22 0.21 3.3
50-64 U 0.39 0.33 17.7a 0.52 0.47 10.2a
M 0.39 0.38 1.7 0.52 0.53 -1.3
Male 0.19 0.16 10.2a 0.23 0.18 13.0a 0.42 0.28 28.7a
0.20 0.19 2.6 0.23 0.22 2.9 0.41 0.39 4.9
Marital Statuses: married as base
single U 0.16 0.13 10.9a 0.06 0.06 1.7 0.19 0.21 -6.8 0.10 0.08 4.9 0.01 0.02 -9.0
M  0.16 0.15 3.9 0.06 0.06 -1.2 0.20 0.20 1.0 0.09 0.07 7.0 0.01 0.01 1.3
widowed U 0.03 0.03 -1.6 0.04 0.05 -5.6 0.02 0.06 -11.6a 0.05 0.05 -1.9 0.03 0.06 -11.9a
M 0.03 0.03 2.7 0.04 0.04 -2.6 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.05 0.05 -0.3 0.03 0.03 0.0
divorced U 0.07 0.06 2.9 0.03 0.03 4.2 0.08 0.06 4.1 0.05 0.04 2.6 0.01 0.01 0.2
M  0.07 0.06 2.0 0.03 0.03 2.8 0.08 0.07 2.4 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.01 0.01 0.1
Self-rated Health: very good as base
good U 0.20 0.16 11.6a 0.16 0.15 1.3 0.18 0.19 -1.6 0.15 0.15 -0.9 0.19 0.16 7.9
M  0.20 0.19 2.8 0.16 0.16 0.4 0.19 0.19 -1.8 0.15 0.14 2.4 0.19 0.18 2.4
fair  U 0.43 0.47 -7.7 0.50 0.48 3.8 0.40 0.47 -14.0a 0.53 0.50 6.2 0.46 0.46 -0.3
M  0.43 0.46 -6.2 0.50 0.52 -2.7 0.40 0.40 -1.4 0.53 0.55 -3.6 0.46 0.48 -3.1
poor  U 0.15 0.19 -11.9a 0.14 0.20 -14.9a 0.18 0.13 12.8a 0.11 0.16 -16.2a 0.19 0.26 -17.7a
M 0.15 0.15 -0.1 0.14 0.15 -0.3 0.17 0.19 -6.9 0.11 0.10 3.6 0.19 0.19 -0.1
very  poor U 0.02 0.03 -3.7 0.01 0.02 -5.0 0.01 0.01 2.7 0.02 0.03 -4.6
M  0.02 0.02 0.3 0.01 0.01 -0.1 0.01 0.02 -2.6 0.02 0.02 -1.7
Household characteristics
House ownership U 0.92 0.88 12.8a 0.97 0.94 11.9a 0.96 0.93 14.0a 0.96 0.94 11.1a 0.93 0.94 -4.7
M  0.92 0.91 2.5 0.97 0.96 0.3 0.96 0.95 3.0 0.96 0.97 -1.8 0.93 0.93 1.4
Three generation U 0.28 0.32 -8.2 0.53 0.46 13.9a 0.67 0.63 7.2 0.50 0.47 6.6 0.26 0.29 -6.5
household M 0.28 0.29 -1.6 0.53 0.49 8.0 0.66 0.65 3.1 0.51 0.50 1.1 0.26 0.26 0.4
Number of household U 3.21 3.42 -13.1a 4.06 4.00 3.7 4.41 4.52 -7.0 3.96 4.01 -3.1 3.26 3.53 -15.2a
members M 3.21 3.34 -8.4 4.06 4.04 1.5 4.45 4.45 -0.2 3.95 3.95 0.0 3.27 3.29 -1.3
Bedridden Statuses of Old Persons Being Cared:
100% bedridden as base
25% bedridden U 0.62 0.27 72.1a 0.58 0.26 73.4a 0.66 0.29 87.2a 0.59 0.17 74.1a 0.55 0.15 69.0a
M 0.62 0.62 0.0 0.58 0.58 0.0 0.65 0.65 0.0 0.58 0.58 0.0 0.54 0.53 3.1
50%  bedridden U 0.34 0.34 -1.1 0.36 0.29 14.0a 0.32 0.31 2.3 0.33 0.30 8.0 0.40 0.31 18.9a
M 0.34 0.34 0.0 0.36 0.36 0.1 0.33 0.33 0.0 0.34 0.34 0.0 0.40 0.41 -3.6
75%  bedridden U 0.03 0.27 -71.3a 0.06 0.31 -70.1a 0.01 0.31 -88.4a 0.06 0.30 -65.5a 0.06 0.31 -68.9a
M 0.03 0.02 3.4 0.06 0.04 4.9 0.01 0.01 0.9 0.06 0.04 4.9 0.06 0.03 6.7
“T” = SL-SL1 caregivers; “C” = CL2-5 caregivers; “Mean SD” = Mean standardized difference (%).
“100% bedridden” = care recipients are completely bedridden such that they lie in bed all day; “75% bedridden” = care recipients are able to sit on the bed, while they often
lie  in bed; “50% bedridden” = care recipients can walk indoors but need help to go outside; “25% bedridden” = care recipients can go outside without help.
a Inference: absolute value of mean standardized difference above 10%.
Table 5
Probability of Being in Work by Gender and Age − DID-PSM Estimations for the LTCI Introduction in 2000
Pre- LTCI Introduction Post- LTCI Introduction DID-PSM
Obs. T C ATT SE T C ATT SE DID SE
Male 217,827 0.501 0.755 −0.254*** 0.02 0.659 0.755 −0.096*** 0.03 0.158*** 0.02
Female 337,203 0.353 0.456 −0.103*** 0.01 0.405 0.471 −0.066*** 0.01 0.037*** 0.01
30–49  230,730 0.606 0.828 −0.222*** 0.02 0.700 0.836 −0.135*** 0.01 0.087*** 0.02
50–64  175,512 0.474 0.624 −0.150*** 0.01 0.563 0.650 −0.087*** 0.01 0.063*** 0.01
65+  70,010 0.210 0.295 −0.085*** 0.02 0.279 0.313 −0.034*** 0.01 0.051*** 0.02
“ ; “SE” 
*
p
f
t
4
a
pT” = Caregivers; “C” = Non-caregivers; “ATT” = Average Treatment Effect on Treated
Inference: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
eople approaching/post retirement to remain/re-enter the labor
orce (Clark et al., 2015), where we verify that the LTCI is practical
o stimulate caregivers’ LFP during their middle and late stages.
.3. Negative spillover effect of the LTCI amendmentWe  further investigate the potential negative effect of the LTCI
mendment on the LFP with the PSM subsamples (Table 6). Com-
ared to the matched counterparts supporting CL2-5 recipients,= Bootstrapped Standard Errors
male SL-SL1 caregivers do not report a better chance to work in the
years before the amendment. For men, despite the large margin in
LFP between caregivers and non-caregivers, the margin is trivial
regarding care intensity among the caregivers. In contrast, female
SL-SL1 caregivers are 9.4 percent more likely to work than the CL2-
5 counterparts, indicating that the LFP of women is sensitive not
only to the care provision but also to the care intensity.
Nonetheless, this advantage in LFP vanishes completely after the
amendment. The DID-PSM estimator shows a 7.7 percent decrease
R. Fu et al. / Journal of Health Economics 56 (2017) 103–112 111
Table  6
Probability of Being in Work by Gender and Age − DID-PSM Estimations for the LTCI Amendment in 2006.
Pre- LTCI Amendment Post- LTCI Amendment DID-PSM
Obs. T C ATT SE T C ATT SE DID SE
Male 4590 0.606 0.578 0.028 0.05 0.529 0.519 0.010 0.04 −0.018 0.06
Female 12,811 0.520 0.426 0.094*** 0.03 0.510 0.493 0.017 0.02 −0.077* 0.04
30–49 2182 0.805 0.606 0.199*** 0.07 0.738 0.753 −0.015 0.05 −0.214** 0.06
50–64 7937 0.638 0.499 0.139** 0.04 0.634 0.613 0.021 0.03 −0.118* 0.04
“  Treat
*
f
s
l
t
f
(
f
i
a
S
y
t
3
5
p
f
s
o
c
P
1
a
L
w
a
l
n
i
o
f
m
r
f
m
p
l
e
g
c
(
t
l
t
5
s
f
f
h65+  7278 0.220 0.215 0.005 0.05 
T” = SL-SL1 caregivers; “C” = CL2-5 caregivers; “ATT” = Average Treatment Effect on
Inference: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
or female SL-SL1 caregivers to work. The most straightforward rea-
on is the reduced beneﬁts for their recipients, among which the
oss of housekeeping services particularly obstructs them in joining
he labor force. In fact, the provision of housekeeping accounted
or the largest share of at-home services before the amendment
Tokunaga et al., 2015). The housekeeping services would free
emale caregivers from the predicament of balancing work, caregiv-
ng, and housekeeping, as failing to manage housework is a stigma
mong Japanese women (Kumagai, 2010). Accordingly, female SL-
L1 caregivers have to reallocate their time in the post-amendment
ears to cover housekeeping services, for which the practicable way
o overcome the difﬁculty is to relinquish work opportunities.
Regarding the age-speciﬁc subsamples, SL-SL1 caregivers aged
0–49 are 19.9 percent more likely to work than the matched CL2-
 counterparts before the amendment; also, a higher 13.9 percent
robability of working is conﬁrmed for those aged 50–64. Like
emale caregivers, the LFP of young and middle-aged caregivers is
ensitive to both the care provision and the care intensity. On the
ther side, the LFP of caregivers 65+ appears to be independent of
are intensity.
The advantages disappear after the amendment, where DID-
SM estimators reveal lower probabilities at 21.4 percent and
1.8 percent of being in work for SL-SL1 caregivers aged 30–49
nd 50–64, respectively. For young caregivers, the reduction in
FP overturns the original advantages. Young caregivers are less
ealthy, such that the reduced upper limit of allowance in the
mendment strongly discourages them from participating in the
abor force. After all, providing care by oneself is the most conve-
ient way to avoid extra-payment for the formal services. However,
t would be a vicious circle for these young caregivers to be outside
f the labor force, as they may  ﬁnd themselves unable to afford
ormal care at the time when they became old and have care needs.
To this end, our ﬁndings reveal a hidden cost of the LTCI amend-
ent: the work opportunities that caregivers forego when they
eallocate their time to provide informal care. Including unpaid
amily caregivers to fulﬁll caregiving obligations, the amendment
ay  curtail expenditures on LTCI in the short run. From a long run
erspective, however, such a policy would signiﬁcantly damage the
abor forces and economies, and the adverse consequences may
xtend beyond the direct caregiving period. In 2014, the Japanese
overnment announced a new amendment on LTCI to contain the
osts with further restrictions on beneﬁts for SL1 and SL2 recipients
Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare, 2014). We  draw attention
o adverse inﬂuences on LFP of such myopic policies, as expanding
abor market supply to sustain the economy should be a priority in
he coming decades.
. Conclusion
In this research, we ﬁrst show that the signiﬁcant and positive
pillover effects of the LTCI introduction on caregivers’ LFP. Parallel
amily policy in Japan that aims to improve the LFP of caregivers
or children (i.e., Child Care and Family Care Leave Act) is found to
ave little success (Asai et al., 2015). The success of LTCI on stim-0.203 0.214 −0.012 0.05 −0.017 0.05
ed; “SE” = Bootstrapped Standard Errors.
ulating caregivers’ LFP is intuitive in the context of the super-aged
society, regarding the increase in caregivers for frail old persons.
Our ﬁnding is in line with previous studies in Japan, but differs
from that in Western countries. Geyer and Korfhage (2015) and
Carmichael and Charles (2003) ﬁnd negative effects of LTCI on LFP
in Germany and the UK, due to the cash allowance that attributes
to caregivers’ nonwage income. The Japanese LTCI with beneﬁts
in kind would provide a good example to other countries where
encouraging caregivers’ LFP is a priority.
Furthermore, we conﬁrm the negative spillover effects of the
LTCI amendment on caregivers’ LFP. This is the ﬁrst evidence that
veriﬁes that caregivers’ LFP would deteriorate when formal ser-
vices become insufﬁcient, which in turn underlines the importance
of LTCI on improving LFP. Further research with concrete cost-
beneﬁt analyses is necessary to assess the monetary loss/gain of
the amendment comprehensively.
Gender differences are found regarding the spillover effect of
LTCI on LFP, which indicates that policies aiming to stimulate LFP
should be formulated separately for men  and women. Speciﬁcally,
policies reducing risk of care provision would be effective to pro-
mote men’s LFP; policies further reducing care burden would help
women remain in labor force. In addition, policy makers should take
age differences into consideration. Young people are highly sensi-
tive to both the provision and the intensity of caregiving and require
a comprehensive policy. For late middle-aged and old people with
an intensive care provision, releasing their care burden is an urgent
priority. A common part of the policies, nonetheless, would be to
improve the ﬂexibility of work schedules and to provide improved
support in caregivers’ workplaces.
This research suffers several limitations. The ﬁrst limitation is a
concern regarding the kernel propensity score matching method on
addressing endogeneity. Since the matching accounts for observ-
able covariates, unobservable inﬂuences still may  remain in the
model. Other researchers try to tackle the issue with the IV method
using family characteristics such as number of siblings or parental
health as instruments (Heitmueller, 2007; Van Houtven et al.,
2013). Further analyses with Japanese data using the IV method
are required for a cohesive picture of the spillover effect of LTCI.
In addition, we  exclusively concentrate on the extensive LFP mar-
gin (i.e. being in work) in the current study. In their recent studies,
Bolin et al. (2008) and Van Houtven et al. (2013) measure the impact
of caregiving on not only the extensive LFP margin, but also the
intensive margin (i.e. working hours) and wages. Further research
in Japan is necessary for such clariﬁcations. The third shortcom-
ing lies on the identiﬁcation of treatment and control groups due
to the universal coverage LTCI system. Public policies in the US
frequently differ across states, making concrete evidence possi-
ble by comparing outcomes with adjacent states; yet, such policy
setting is not practical in Japan. Finally, our ﬁndings may  suffer
from selection bias since we  could observe only the caregivers of
non-institutionalized recipients. Further studies that include recip-
ients institutionalized and utilize more plausible randomization of
treatment are necessary to clarify the spillover effect of LTCI on
stimulating LFP.
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